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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
OVERVIEW
In considering a variety of important labor law topics, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals issued a number of unanimous opinions. This
article will examine the major issues in four of these decisions. In
Harberson v. NLRB,' the court considered the appropriateness of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board's (the "Board") deferral to an arbitrator's
decision on an unfair labor practice issue. Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp. 2 marked
a reassessment of the Tenth Circuit's position on the standard for deter-
mining when an employee has been constructively discharged. In ad-
dressing the issue of hybrid versus non-hybrid actions, the court in
Garcia v. Eidal International Corp.3 made an important exception to the
DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters4 rule in selecting the
proper statute of limitations period. Finally, in Crenshaw v. Quarles Drill-
ing Corp.,5 the Tenth Circuit construed the Fair Labor Standards Act fo-
cusing on the requirements necessary for a Belo contract, and the
questions regarding liquidated damages and statute of limitations.
I. THE STANDARD FOR BOARD DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION
A. Background
It is not uncommon in labor law for an employee to assert that one's
"rights," under both section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act 6 (the
"Act") and a collective bargaining agreement, have been violated by the
employer. An employee's statutory rights under section 7 of the Act
include the right to form, join or assist labor unions, bargain collec-
tively, and engage in other concerted activities. 7 Section 10 of the Act
empowers the Board to protect such rights by making findings, issuing
orders, and petitioning for the enforcement of such orders in a court of
law.8
In addition to the rights under the Act, employees can obtain rights
under a collective bargaining agreement, such as the right to refuse to
cross an approved picket line and the right of arbitration. In this situa-
tion, the enforcement of such rights is contractual, with both manage-
ment and labor agreeing to submit to an impartial arbitrator any
contractual dispute.
An employer's single act can, in many situations, be a violation of an
I. 810 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1987).
2. 796 F.2d 340 (10th Cir. 1986).
3. 808 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1986).
4. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
5. 798 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1986).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
7. Id.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)-(i) (1982).
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employee's statutory, as well as contractual, rights. The question that
then arises is: what happens when a union, after submitting a losing
dispute to arbitration, files an unfair labor practice action? Can or
should the Board defer to the arbitrator and assume that the unfair la-
bor practice issue was also resolved? The Board has determined that in
some situations it will defer to an arbitrator's decision on an unfair labor
practice. The standard used to determine when this deferral is appro-
priate has, however, been a volatile one.
In Spielberg Manufacturing Co. ,9 the Board determined that if the arbi-
tration proceedings appeared to be fair and regular, if the arbitrator's
decision was not "clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
Act" and if all parties agreed to be bound, Board deference was
proper.10 Eight years later, in Raytheon Co.,'' the Board added a fourth
requirement that an unfair labor practice issue had to be "fully and fairly
litigated" before the Board would give effect to an arbitrator's deci-
sion.' 2 In Yourga Trucking,'3 the Board insisted that the party urging
deferral bear the burden of proving that the statutory issue was ad-
vanced in the arbitration. However, in 1974, the Board, in Electronic Re-
production Service Corp., 4 changed its course radically by holding that if
an unfair labor practice issue was not raised in arbitration but could
have been, the Board must defer unless there were "unusual circum-
stances."' 15 However, a few years later, in Suburban Motor Freight, Inc.,
16
the Board disavowed the Electronic Reproduction decision by holding that
it would not defer to an arbitration decision which bore "no indication
that the arbitrator ruled on the statutory issue."' 7 Finally, in 1984, the
Board reaffirmed a modified Spielberg standard in Olin Corp.' 8 and re-
versed Suburban Motor Freight by shifting the burden of proof onto the
party opposing deferral.19
9. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
10. Id. at 1082.
11. 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963).
12. Id. at 887.
13. 197 N.L.R.B. 928 (1972).
14. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
15. Id. at 764.
16. 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).
17. Id. at 147.
18. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984). The Board held that:
[Aln arbitrator has adequately considered the unfair labor practice if (1) the con-
tractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue, and (2) the
arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair
labor practice. In this respect, differences, if any, between the contractual and
statutory standards of review should be weighed by the Board as part of its deter-
mination under the Spielberg standards of whether an award is 'clearly repugnant'
to the Act. And, with regard to the inquiry into the 'clearly repugnant' standard,
we would not require an arbitrator's award to be totally consistent with Board
precedent. Unless the award is 'palpably wrong,' i.e., unless the arbitrator's deci-
sion is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act, we will defer.
Id. at 574.
19. Id. at 574.
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B. Interpreting the Olin Standard
1. Case in Context
Harberson v. NLRB 20 reviewed the Olin standard as applied by the
Board in this case. The Tenth Circuit's interpretation was that the Olin
standard could be interpreted in different ways, depending on the par-
ticular factual setting to which it is applied. Because the Board had not
adequately explained why it had rejected the administrative law judge's
(the "ALJ") interpretation and application of the Olin standard, the
court remanded the dcase to the Board. The Tenth Circuit held that
merely stating the Olin decision, without discussing it in light of the ap-
plicable factual circumstances, was not acceptable.
2. Statement of the Case
Two sympathy strikers, Harberson and Talley, refused to cross a
lawful picket line organized by one of the three unions representing the
Hilton Hotel employees. When the strike was settled, the two strikers
returned to work and were told that they had been permanently re-
placed and put on a preferential hiring list.
2 1
As a result of the employer's actions, two issues arose. First, be-
cause the collective bargaining agreement stated that employees would
not be disciplined or discharged for refusing to cross a legally approved
picket line,22 there was a potential breach of contract. Secondly, there
was a potential unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
23
It was determined in arbitration that there was not a violation of the
contract when the two employees were permanently replaced. Thereaf-
ter, the union filed an unfair labor practice action. The employer urged
that the ALJ defer to the arbitrator's decision; however, the ALJ found
that deferral was not appropriate because the contractual claims were
not relevant in deciding the statutory claims. 2 4 The Board reversed the




The AL took the position that the contractual issue was not factu-
ally parallel to the unfair labor practice issue because the arbitrators did
not consider the factual question of whether the employees hired to re-
place the plaintiffs undertook the same job assignments. Because this
issue was essential to the unfair labor practice question,26 the ALJ held
20. 810 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1987).
21. Id. at 979-80.
22. Id. at 980.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) provides in part that an employer cannot discrimi-
nate for the purpose of discouraging an employee's right to engage in concerted activities.
24. Denver Hilton Hotel, 272 N.L.R.B. 488, 491 (1984).
25. Id. at 488.
26. Id. at 491. This issue is important under the Act because economic strikers' right
for reinstatement hinges upon whether permanent replacements have actually been ob-
19881
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that the Olin standard had not been met and, consequently, that the un-
fair labor practice issue had not been presented in arbitration.
The Tenth Circuit found this interpretation to be reasonable and
refused to sanction the Board's rejection of the same. 27 In what can be
considered the heart and soul of the Harberson opinion, the Tenth Cir-
cuit noted that "[w]hen applied to a particular factual situation, the stan-
dard for deferral set out in Olin may be interpreted in various ways." '28
The ALJ's finding that the facts relating to the unfair labor practice were
not adequately presented to the arbitrator were, according to the court,
strongly supported in the record. Whereas, the court could not find
such support in the Board's decision.2 9 Thus, the Board's mere asser-
tion that the ALJ was wrong was rejected because the court had no idea
how the Board was interpreting Olin in light of the specific factual situa-
,tion. Consequently, rather than manufacturing an interpretation of the
Olin standard for the Board, the court remanded the case in hopes that
the Board would provide one.
4. Implications of Holding
Absent from the Tenth Circuit's opinion is an analysis of the Olin
standard. While the court was certainly aware of the debate over the
standard, 30 the judges apparently did not wish to state their position
until they could review the Board's interpretation of the various ele-
ments of the Olin standard. Presumably, the court will eventually have to
resolve the issue of whether the Olin standard, as implemented by the
Board, is allowable under the Act. Thus, it will be useful to explore
some of the major areas of controversy surrounding Olin.
Several problems are raised by those who disagree with the Board's
decision in Olin. One scholar noted that even though there are two
"safety devices" in the Olin standard - the contractual issue must be
"factually parallel" to the unfair labor practice issue and the arbitrator
must be presented with the facts necessary to resolve the unfair labor
practice, 3 ' - they are rendered completely ineffectual by the Board's
insistence that the party resisting deferral bear the burden of proof.32
Professor Ray also noted that the records of many arbitration decisions
are far from complete, sometimes stating an award in only a few
sentences. 33 Consequently, the Board, without the arbitrator's reason-
tained. If the replacements are not permanent and the employer refuses to reinstate the
economic strikers after they have made an unconditional offer to return, there is a poten-
tial unfair labor practice under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act. See NLRB v. Int'l
Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48 (1972), and NLRB v. McKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1938).
27. Harberson, 810 F.2d at 983.
28. Id. at 984.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 982-83.
31. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
32. Ray, Individual Rights and NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process: A Proposal, 28




ing and factual basis before it, is not able to make determinations under
the established standards. 34 Furthermore, the Olin standard provides
that the General Counsel, who is never present at an arbitration, bear
the burden of proving that relevant facts and evidence were not
presented. 3 5 Given these circumstances, it seems unlikely that the
Board will be able to protect the individual rights mandated in section
10(a) of the Act.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly denounced Olin in Tay-
lor v. NLRB. 3 6 Taking note of several factors addressed by the Fifth Cir-
cuit,3 7 the court communicated its conviction that employees need to
have a forum, independent of the arbitration arena, to advance their
statutory rights. 3 8 The factors that the court considered especially im-
portant were that many arbitrators are principally educated in the "law
of the shop," and thus may lack the sophistication to decide intricate
statutory issues, and that fact finding in arbitration is usually not analo-
gous to judicial fact finding. 39 The Eleventh Circuit further condemned
the Board's position that deferral is appropriate unless it is affirmatively
shown that an unusual situation exists, thus necessitating an independ-
ent exploration by the ALJ into the employee's statutory claims. 40 The
court stated that this position neglects those situations where contrac-
tual and statutory issues factually correspond but entail different levels
of proof and issues of factual relevance.
4 1
The final problem is raised by the forceful dissent in Olin. Board
member Zimmerman recognized that the deferral policy adopted by the
Board could actually deter arbitration rather than encourage it. Zim-
merman suggested that unions might begin demanding that all arbitra-
tions be performed in a very formal, on-the-record manner. Thus, many
advantages of arbitration - less expensive, quicker, and less formal -
could quickly evaporate.
4 2
II. THE STANDARD FOR ASSESSING CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
A. Background
The utilization of constructive discharge in Title V1143 cases has its
34. Id. at 13.
35. Id.
36. 786 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986).
37. McNair v. United States Postal Service, 768 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1985).
38. Taylor, 786 F.2d at 1521.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1522.
41. Id.
42. Henkel and Kelly, Deferral to Arbitration After Olin and United Technologies: Has the
NLRB Gone Too Far?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 37 (Wntr. 1986).
43. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982) provides that:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such an individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin; or
(2) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
1988]
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roots in the National Labor Relations Act's (the "Act") prohibition on
employer discrimination "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage mem-
bership in any labor organization. ' 44 To establish an unfair labor prac-
tice under section 8(a)(3) of the Act, it must be shown that an employee
was terminated because of his union activity. 4 5 The Board has, how-
ever, recognized that employers could subject union employees to harsh
working conditions, thereby avoiding the literal prohibition of anti-
union discrimination.
46
Applying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it was found that
employers could use the same methods to circumvent the prohibition on
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act as they had used to avoid the
Act's prohibition of anti-union discrimination. As a result, the circuit
courts also adopted the doctrine of constructive discharge.4 7 The utili-
zation of this doctrine, however, resulted in a controversy among the
circuit courts as to what an employee must prove to establish a construc-
tive discharge. The "objective standard" - adopted by the First,4 8 Sec-
ond, 49 Third,50 Fifth,5 1 Sixth, 52 Ninth,5 3 Eleventh, 54 and District of
Columbia5 5 Circuit Courts of Appeals - is met upon an employee's
showing that the working conditions "have been so difficult or unpleas-
ant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt
compelled to resign. "56 Under the "subjective standard" - adopted by
the Fourth, 57 Eighth 58 and, until recently, the Tenth 59 Circuit Courts of
Appeals - a constructive discharge "exists when an employer deliber-
ately renders the employee's working conditions intolerable and thus
forces him to quit his job."60 Thus, this two-prong subjective standard
requires one to not only consider the unpleasantness of the working
conditions, but to consider the employer's subjective mental state or
intent.
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
45. 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 187 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983).
46. O'Toole, Choosing a Standard for Constructive Discharge in Title VII Litigation, 71 COR-
NELL L. REV. 587 (1986) [hereinafter "O'Toole"].
47. Id. at 591.
48. Rosado v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977).
49. Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1983).
50. Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984).
51. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980).
52. Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982).
53. Heagney v. University of Wash., 652 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981).
54. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
55. Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
56. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting
Rosado v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977)).
57. EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983).
58. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981).
59. Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 825 (1975).
60. Muller, 509 F.2d at 929.
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B. The Employment of the Objective Standard. Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp.
1. Case in Context
The holding in Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp.6 1 is important in that the Tenth
Circuit explicitly changed the requirements for proving a constructive
discharge. The decision marks the rejection of the subjective standard
established by the Tenth Circuit in Muller v. U.S. Steel Corp.6 2 and the
adoption of the objective standard as developed by the Fifth Circuit in
Bourque v. Powell Electric Manufacturing Co. 63
2. Statement of Case
After Gail Derr was demoted, she resigned and filed an action alleg-
ing that the demotion was the result of sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The trial court agreed with Ms.
Derr's contentions that Gulf had discriminated against her when it trans-
ferred her to the lower position and that she had been constructively
discharged, and thus ordered that she be reinstated and awarded back
pay.64
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's "unqualified adoption" 65 of the less stringent
objective standard seems to reflect a frustration with the troublesome
task of analyzing an employer's state of mind. Indeed, ascertaining what
a particular person "intended" is one of the most difficult and elusive
problems in the law. Thus, in rejecting the two-prong subjective test,
the court simply presumed that an employer "intended those conse-
quences it could reasonably have foreseen,"'6 6 thereby making an em-
ployer's state of mind irrelevant notwithstanding an employer's denial
of the existence of any wrongful intent. Consequently, the objective
standard simplifies the fact finder's task by redirecting the focus away
from the employer's nebulous mental state onto a more manageable
"reasonable person" standard.
4. Implications of Holding
The acceptance of the objective standard will be advantageous to
workers and their unions. Employees may prevail where they would not
have otherwise had the subjective standard been applied. For example,
consider the situation where an employer is satisfied with an employee's
performance in a particular job classification but refuses to promote the
worker because of the employee's sex. Under the subjective standard, a
constructive discharge would not be found because the employer did
61. 796 F.2d 340 (10th Cir. 1986).
62. 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1975).
63. 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980).
64. Derr, 796 F.2d at 341-42.
65. Id. at 344.
66. Id. (quoting Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1175 n. 8 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
1988]
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not have the requisite intent to make working conditions so intolerable
that the employee would resign. The employer wants the employee to
stay in the position without having to promote. Whereas, under the ob-
jective standard, an employee would prevail upon the trier of fact's find-
ing that the employer, by his illegal discrimination, had "made working
conditions so difficult that a reasonable person in the employee's posi-
tion would feel compelled to resign."'6 7 Thus, the employee would be
fully compensated regardless of the employer's intent.
68
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the utilization of the
less burdensome objective standard will necessarily manifest a major in-
crease in the number of employee resignations. The leading circuit in
this area, the Fifth Circuit, has stated that "the policies underlying Title
VII will best be served if, whenever possible, unlawful discrimination is
attacked within the context of existing employment relationships.
'" 6 9
The objective standard does not allow an employee to resign solely be-
cause the employer's discrimination takes the form of unequal pay. An
employee has a duty to mitigate damages by remaining on the job and
trying to rectify the problems either through internal grievance proce-
dures or by filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. Only when there is no reasonable possibility of rescuing
the employment relationship - measured by the court's objective stan-
dard - will an employee who resigns be considered constructively
discharged.
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN HYBRID ACTIONS
A. Background
Because Congress remained mute on the issue, a question arose in
Garcia v. Eidal International Corp. 70 as to what statute of limitations period
should apply to suits brought under section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 (the "LMRA"). 7 1 For over one hundred
years, the established precedent has been that, when Congress does not
supply a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, the states'
statutes of limitations apply. 72 However, in DelCostello v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,73 the United States Supreme Court made an ex-
ception to this general rule. The Court held that when an employee files
a "hybrid action" - a suit against the employer for a breach of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement and the union for a breach of its duty of fair
representation - the six-month statute of limitations period provided
for by section 10(b) of the Act 74 controls the claim against both the em-
67. Id. at 344.
68. See O'Toole, supra note 46, at 615.
69. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980).
70. 808 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1986).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
72. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); see also M'Cluny v. Silliman,
27 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
73. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
74. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
[Vol. 65:4
LABOR EMPLOYMENT LAW
ployer and the union under section 301 actions. 75
B. An Exception to DelCostello: Garcia v. Eidal International Corp.
1. Case in Context
Garcia v. Eidal International Corp.76 involved a review of the district
court's interpretation and application of the DelCostello hybrid standard.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court's decision to impose
the six month federal statute of limitations, and held that the DelCostello
standard is not to be applied when an employer has renounced all of its
responsibilities under a collective bargaining agreement. 77 Conse-
quently, the court indicated that a worker's section 301 claim under the
LMRA should be "analogized to an action on a contract, and the appro-
priate state limitations period should be applied."
'78
2. Statement of the Case
Eidal International Corporation ("Eidal") terminated all of its bar-
gaining unit employees after it allegedly sold its business to Jencor In-
ternational Corporation ("Jencor"). Because Eidal did not transfer their
collective bargaining agreement with the sale, Jencor's employees -
only a few of whom were former Eidal employees - were subject to less
favorable working terms.
79
Eighteen months after being notified of the sale, Eidal's former em-
ployees filed an action under section 301 of the LMRA8 0 against the
union, Eidal, and Jencor. 8 1 The employees asserted that Jencor was
simply Eidal's alter ego and that the actions taken by Eidal were pursued
for the sole purpose of avoiding its obligations under the collective
bargaining agreement. The employees further contended that, because
the union had not informed them of the sale and had signed a pre-hire




In hybrid actions, employees assert not only that their employers
treated them unfairly, but also that the union treated them unfairly be-
cause it represented them in a discriminatory, arbitrary, and perfunctory
manner in the arbitration process. Consequently, in order to prevail in
this type of action, the employees must prove that the union breached its
duty of fair representation. Otherwise, if the union has met its duty of
75. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166, 172.
76. 808 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1986).
77. Id. at 719.
78. Id. at 721.
79. Id. at 719.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
81. Garcia, 808 F.2d at 719.
82. Id.
1988]
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fair representation, the arbitrator's decision will be final and binding.83
The question facing the Tenth Circuit in Garcia was whether the
particular factual situation was a hybrid action as defined in DelCostello.
8 4
Rejecting the lower court's position that it was a hybrid action, the
Tenth Circuit carved an exception to the DelCostello rule because of fac-
tual differences and policy considerations.
85
On the surface, Garcia appears to fit into the DelCostello mold in that
an employee sued both his employer for breach of contract and his
union for breach of the duty of fair representation. The court, however,
found a subtle factual difference which took Garcia out of the scope of
DelCostello.
Unlike the DelCostello situation, 8 6 the employees in Garcia claimed
that the employer unilaterally sold out to its alter ego, Jencor, in order
to repudiate the collective bargaining agreement and escape arbitration.
Therefore, in order for the employees to prevail against the employer
under these circumstances, the employees do not have to prove that the
union failed in its duty of fair representation. Instead, if the employees
prove their assertion against their employer, the employer will be liable
and such liability will be separate from the union's liability.8 7 The
Tenth Circuit, therefore, refused to allow the employer to label the
claim as a hybrid action simply because the union had consented to the
breach. Since the claim against the employer is contractual, the court
found that the appropriate state statute of limitations must be applied.
88
Judge Seymour's opinion also noted that the policy considerations
which had contributed to the outcome in DelCostello are absent in Garcia.
The Court in DelCostello implemented the shorter six month statute of
limitations primarily because it recognized that if decisions interpreting
a collective bargaining agreement could be challenged years later, the
relationship between labor and management could be severely dis-
rupted. 8 9 Speed and finality are paramount when the issue under con-
sideration is intertwined with the open and ongoing working
relationships between management and labor. 90
In Garcia, there was no open and ongoing relationship. Assuming
the truth of the employees' allegations, the employer had repudiated the
entire contract, thereby leaving those employees covered under the con-
tract "outside and looking in." With all contractual relationships shat-
tered by the company's bad faith and unilateral actions, the employees'
83. United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1981).
84. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
85. Garcia, 808 F.2d at 721.
86. In DelCostello, a single employee charged that his employer had discharged him in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and that his union had not properly repre-
sented him in the grievance procedure. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 155.
87. Garcia, 808 F.2d at 721.
88. Id. at 723.
89. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169 (quoting from United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell,
451 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1981)).
90. Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 867 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1122
(1985).
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allegation that the dispute was not subject to arbitration was legiti-
mate. 9 1 Hence, because there was no longer any resemblance of a day-
to-day working relationship, the rationale for swift and uniform resolu-
tions of labor disputes vanished.
4. Implications of Holding
The significance of this opinion is the Tenth Circuit's creation of a
limited exception to the DelCostello rule - a bad faith dissolution of the
day-to-day employment relationship. Therefore, in determining what
statute of limitations will be applied in a particular section 301 action,
labor attorneys are well advised to carefully scrutinize all cases which at
first glance appear to be a hybrid-DelCostello variety.
IV. ASSESSING THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
A. Background
1. The Belo Contract
Section 207(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA")
specifies that an employer cannot force his employees to work more
than forty hours a week unless he pays them time-and-a-half for the time
worked over forty hours.9 2 This overtime provision was instituted to
reduce unemployment by prodding employers to hire more workers
who would work fewer hours, and to offset, at least partially, the margi-
nal costs incurred by employees who work additional hours.
93
An exception to this standard, however, was recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in Walling, DOL v. A.H. Belo Corp.9 4 The
so-called "Belo contract" was subsequently codified by the United
States Congress. 9 5  This exception was created in response to the
problems which arose when particular job classifications required em-
ployees to work hours fluctuating above and below forty hours per
week. 96 Rather than subjecting employees to the uncertainty of fluctuat-
ing weekly paychecks, the Belo contract permits employers and employ-
91. Garcia, 808 F.2d at 722.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1982).
93. Donovan v. Brown Equip. and Service Tools, Inc., 666 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1982).
94. 316 U.S. 624 (1942).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 207(0 states that:
No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) of this section by
employing any employee for a workweek in excess of the maximum workweek
applicable to such employee under subsection (a) of this section if such employee
is employed pursuant to a bona fide individual contract, or pursuant to an agree-
ment made as a result of collective bargaining by representatives of employees, if
the duties of such employees necessitate irregular hours of work, and the contract
or agreement (1) specifies a regular rate of pay of not less than the minimum
hourly rate provided in subsection (a) or (b) of section 206 of this title (whichever
may be applicable) and compensation at not less than one and one-half times
such rate for all hours worked in excess of such maximum workweek, and (2) pro-
vides a weekly guaranty of pay for not more than sixty hours based on the rates so
specified.
96. Donovan, 666 F.2d at 153.
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ees working "irregular hours" 9 7 to agree upon a fixed weekly salary.
98
B. Employer Limitations Under the FLSA: Crenshaw v. Quarles Drilling
Corp.
1. Case in Context
Crenshaw v. Quarles Drilling Corp.9 9 provides a useful discussion of
several of the important concepts found in the FLSA. After characteriz-
ing the elements of the section 207(f) exception,10 0 the Tenth Circuit
held that the exception did not apply in this case because the "irregular
hours" requirement had not been satisfied.' 0 1 After much discussion,
the court further found that the three-year - not the two-year - statute
of limitations was appropriate because the employer had committed a
"willful violation" of the Act.' 0 2 Finally, after analyzing section 216(b)
of the FLSA, 10 3 which provides for liquidated damages equal to the
amount of the unpaid overtime, and concluding that the employer did
not show that its actions were taken in good faith, Judge Tacha upheld
the district court's decision to award plaintiff liquidated damages.
10 4
2. Statement of the Case
Crenshaw, a drilling equipment mechanic for Quarles Drilling Cor-
poration ("Quarles"), performed routine maintenance and responded
to emergency situations at drilling sites. Crenshaw and Quarles entered
into a contract whereby Crenshaw was to be paid a set biweekly wage
based on a sixty-hour work week. After working for Quarles for approx-
imately three years, Crenshaw filed this suit alleging that Quarles had
violated the overtime requirements of the FLSA. The district court
agreed with Crenshaw's assertions, and Quarles appealed.
3. Analysis
a. The Belo Contract
Two of the three requisite elements of a Belo contract were dis-
puted in Crenshaw. The first element at issue was whether the contract
designated a "regular rate" of pay
10 5 as required by section 207(f).'
0 6
97. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
98. Donovan, 666 F.2d at 153.
99. 798 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1986).
100. Id. at 1347. (The elements of the section 207(f) exception are, as described in
Donovan v. Brown Equip. and Service Tools, Inc., 666 F.2d 148, 153 (5th Cir. 1982), as
follows: "First, the duties of the employee must 'necessitate irregular hours of work.' 29
U.S.C. § 207(f) (1982). Second, the employee must be employed pursuant to a bona fide
individual contract or collective bargaining agreement. Id. Third, that contract must
'specifqy] a regular rate of pay' for hours up to forty and one and one-half times that rate
for hours over forty. Id. at § 207(f)(1). Finally,. the contract must provide a weekly pay
guarantee for not more than sixty hours, based on the specified rates.").
101. Id. at 1349.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1982).
103. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
104. Crenshaw, 798 F.2d at 1351.
105. The "regular rate" of pay has been defined as "the hourly rate actually paid for
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After the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court's reliance on an
employee's testimony 10 7 was justified, the court emphasized that it
would not tolerate after-the-fact calculations by unscrupulous
employers. ' 0 8
The second element disputed was whether Crenshaw worked "ir-
regular hours."' 109 The court, acknowledging that fluctuating hours are
not necessarily equivalent to "irregular hours," 1 10 concurred with a
Fifth Circuit decision which held that "[flor hours to be considered ir-
regular within the meaning of section 7(f), they must, in a significant
number of weeks, fluctuate both below forty hours per week as well as
above." 1 1 ' Therefore, working fifty hours one week and ninety hours
the next constitutes fluctuating hours but does not constitute "irregular
hours" as contemplated under section 207(f) of the Act. Instead, there
must be a "significant" number of weeks worked under forty hours
before a court will conclude that an employee has worked "irregular
hours." 1 12
b. The Statute of Limitations under the FLSA
The Tenth Circuit was also faced with determining the applicable
statute of limitations period. Section 255(a) establishes a two-year stat-
ute of limitations for any cause of action concerning "unpaid minimum
wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938."113 However, if there is a "willful
violation" of the Act, a three-year statute of limitations is applicable.
1 14
In contemplating whether an employer's behavior is "willful," the
court adopted the Fifth Circuit's former approach. ' 15 In Coleman v. Jiffy
June Farms, Inc. ,116 the Fifth Circuit held that an "employer's decision to
change his employees' rate of pay in violation of the FLSA is 'willful'
when ... there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding
that the employer knew or suspected that his actions might violate the
FLSA." 1 17
the normal, non-overtime work-week." Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37,
40 (1944).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 207(f)(1) (1982).
107. Quarles' testimony that the parties had designated a "regular rate" of pay contra-
dicted Crenshaw's testimony. Crenshaw, 798 F.2d at 1348.
108. Id. (quoting Triple "AAA" Co. v. Wirtz, 378 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1967)).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 207(f) (1982).
110. Crenshaw, 798 F.2d at 1348.
111. Id. (quoting Donovan v. Brown Equip. and Service Tools, Inc., 666 F.2d 148, 154
(5th Cir. 1982)); see also Donovan v. Tierra Vista Inc., 796 F.2d 1259, 1260 (10th Cir.
1986).
112. Crenshaw, 798 F.2d at 1348.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1982).
114. Id.
115. Donovan v. McKissick Products Co., 719 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1983).
116. 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
117. Id. at 1142. The Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S.
111, 127-28 (1985), held that this broad standard is inappropriate for determining liqui-
dated damages, but the Court did not rule on what is the appropriate standard for the
statute of limitations. The Fifth Circuit, in Halfertz v. Pulse Drug Co., 826 F.2d 2 (5th Cir.
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In Crenshaw, the company's tax manager testified that he believed
that Crenshaw should have been paid overtime for hours exceeding
sixty.' " 8 This, coupled with Crenshaw's time sheets demonstrating that
he continually worked more than sixty hours a week, was substantial evi-
dence for the district and the Tenth Circuit courts to conclude -that
Quarles should have known that the FLSA was applicable. Accordingly,
the court found Quarles' violation to be "willful" and, thus, applied the
three-year statute of limitations.' 19
c. Liquidated Damages
The Tenth Circuit also reviewed the district court's liquidated dam-
ages award to Crenshaw. The FLSA permits the awarding of liquidated
damages in an amount equal to the unpaid overtime unless the em-
ployer proves that its failure to pay overtime compensation was in good
faith and that it reasonably presumed that such action/inaction would
not constitute a FLSA violation.120 The court rejected Quarles' conten-
tion that its misbelief that Crenshaw's employment contract fell under
the section 207(f) exception constituted "reasonable grounds" since the
statute's mandate could be easily evaded by an employer simply claim-
ing that it misunderstood the FLSA's requirements.' 2 1 Consequently,
the court held that the district court did not err in awarding liquidated
damages. 
122
4. Implication of Holding
a. The Belo Contract
There are several important issues which the court addressed in its
interpretation of the FLSA provisions enumerated in Crenshaw. One of
the most significant comes from the discussion on the so-called "Belo"
contract. In reaffirming the notion that fluctuating hours are not neces-
sarily equivalent to "irregular hours," the Tenth Circuit clearly stated
that an employer cannot work a salaried employee as much as it wants
without compensating for overtime. To fall within the Belo exception, a
"significant"' 123 number of the work weeks must fall below forty hours.
However, the court did not define "significant." The only conclusion
that can be drawn with any certainty is that if an employee works fewer
than forty hours per week, 6.9% 124 of the time, then the Tenth Circuit
will deem the same to be insignificant.
1987), and Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1168 (5th Cir. 1987), subsequently
rejected its Jiffy June standard as being too broad in light of Trans World. The Tenth Cir-
cuit, in Crenshaw, rejected this interpretation of Trans World. See infra note 118 and accom-
panying text.
118. Crenshaw, 798 F.2d at 1350.
119. Id.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1982).
121. Crenshaw, 798 F.2d at 1351.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1349.
124. Id.
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b. The Statute of Limitations and Liquidated Damages
The court's findings regarding the statute of limitations and liqui-
dated damages place an employer on notice that it must analyze not only
the FLSA provisions but also the particular factual setting at issue. The
Tenth Circuit has made it clear that it will not condone tenuous justifica-
tions by the employer such as "I did not know" or "I did not understand
the law."
In the case of liquidated damages, for example, an employer is re-
quired to show "reasonable" grounds for believing that it had not vio-
lated FLSA. Several circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, have held that
an employer's claim of ignorance of the Act's requirements is not a rea-
sonable ground. 12
5
Similarly, if a statute of limitations issue arises, it is evident that the
court will not tolerate an employer ignoring the particular factual situa-
tion when claiming it did not willfully violate FLSA. If an employer
should have known that its employees might have been covered by the
Act, it will be held that the employer's violation of FLSA was
"willful." 126
CONCLUSION
In a series of well written opinions, several important themes and
positions emerged during the 1986-87 survey period. First, the Tenth
Circuit insisted upon the need for a careful factual analysis. This was
evident in the Harberson opinion when the court refused to uphold a
Board decision because of the Board's failure to adequately discuss the
factual aspects of the case. In the Garcia case, the Tenth Circuit again
showed its preoccupation with factual detail and careful analysis by dis-
tinguishing this case from the closely related DelCostello standard in ana-
lyzing the statute of limitations in a hybrid action.
Finally, the court in this survey period showed a willingness to pro-
vide workers with some protection against unscrupulous employers. In
Crenshaw, the Tenth Circuit clearly stated that it will not tolerate employ-
ers who work employees long hours without paying overtime compensa-
tion. The court also noted that an employer will not be able to avoid the
FLSA by simply asserting that it did not understand the FLSA. Instead,
the court adopted a "should have known" standard which provides
working people with a greater degree of protection and carries out the
legislative intent of the FLSA. Similarly, in dealing with the issue of con-
structive discharge, the court in Derr rejected the subjective standard
and replaced it with the more manageable objective standard. This,
125. Sinclair v. Auto. Club of Okla., Inc., 733 F.2d 726, 730 (10th Cir. 1984); see also
Marshall v. Brunner. 668 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir. 1982) and Barcellona v. Tiffany English
Pub, Inc., 597 F.2d 464, 468-69 (5th Cir. 1979).
126. Crenshaw, 798 F.2d at 1349-50.
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also, should give employees more protection against those employers
with a predisposition towards illegal conduct.
Steven Al. Francy
